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I. Introduction 
³7KHGHULYDWLYHVJHQLHLVQRZZHOORXWRIWKHERWWOHDQGWKHVHLQVWUXPHQWVZLOODOPRVW
FHUWDLQO\PXOWLSO\LQYDULHW\DQGQXPEHUXQWLOVRPHHYHQWPDNHVWKHLUWR[LFLW\FOHDU«>7KH\@
are financial weapons of mass destruction, carrying dangers that, while latent, are 
potentially lethal´ (Buffet, 2002). 7KLV LV KRZ :DUUHQ %XIIHW WKH ZRUOGµV JUHDWHVW VWRFN
market investor, known as the sage of Omaha expressed his concern about derivatives in his 
2002 Berkshire Hathaway letter to shareholders.  
 
These words were indeed prophetic and put the spotlight on the question of whether 
and how this market should be regulated. The relevant issues are quite complex and there 
are many diverse opinions regarding the question of regulation in general and within the 
context of the derivatives market in particular. The main aim of this paper is to shed light to 
the question of whether political bias reflects attitudes towards derivatives regulation. To 
this end, I will use articles from two highly regarded and popular newspapers and look for 
connections between political orientation and derivatives policy.  This research might, in 
turn, shed light on the relative efficiency and effectiveness of various methods for 
derivatives regulation. Determining the best policy for derivatives regulation is beyond the 
scope of this paper. However, locating problems in existing policy is a much more modest 
goal. The secondary aim of this paper, therefore, is to locate such problems, especially if 
they stem from political bias.  
Political bias is not always easy to identify and is not necessarily a problem if there is 
a satisfactory balance and recognition of its existence. In Italy, for example, where the 
current Prime Minister, Sylvio Berlusconi, controls most of the media, there is likely to be a 
strong political bias in favour of his opinions. This fact is however widely recognized and so 
it is not so dangerous in influencing public opinion. In countries like the USA or the UK which 
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have a tradition of press freedom and freedom of speech the danger of political bias is 
potentially greater because of the belief in objectivity and balance. In these countries, 
journalists have a reputation for independence and factual reporting, but the selection of 
which facts to report is what can lead to the subtle introduction of bias. This type of subtle 
bias is more dangerous than the direct or blatant bias because it is not recognized for what 
it is. 
In some cases the political bias can be national as is observed in the current 
reporting of the Euro crisis in Britain and the Eurozone. The vast majority of the British press 
seems to relish the possible demise of the Euro while their European counterparts offer a 
more supportive view of the Euro.    
The subject of market regulation is one that has divided economists since the 
.H\QHVLDQFKDOOHQJHWRWKHFODVVLFDOYLHZGXULQJWKH¶V6LQFHWKHQWKHUHKDVEHHQWKH
PRQHWDULVWUHVSRQVH LQWKH¶VFKDPSLRQHGE\0LOWRQ)ULHGPDQZKLFKUH-asserted the 
virtues of the free market and sought to dismiss the effectiveness of any government 
interventions beyond the control of the money supply. Despite being a well-respected 
academic, Friedman had a political agenda and tried to use economic theory to support his 
views. ³)RUGHFDGHV0LOWRQ)ULHGPDQ¶VSublic image and fame were defined largely by his 
pronouncements on monetary policy and his creation of the doctrine known as monetarism. 
,W¶V VRPHZKDW VXUSULVLQJ WR UHDOL]H WKHQ WKDW PRQHWDULVP LV QRZ ZLGHO\ UHJDUGHG DV D
failure, and that some of the thLQJV )ULHGPDQ VDLG DERXW ³PRQH\´ DQGPRQHWDU\ SROLF\²
unlike what he said about consumption and inflation²appear to have been misleading, and 
SHUKDSVGHOLEHUDWHO\VR´7KH1HZ<RUN5HYLHZRI%RRNV:KRZDV0LOWRQ)ULHGPDQ3DXO
Krugman 2007) 
 ,QWKH¶Vthe free market lobby was further boosted by the adoption of supply 
side policies, by Reagan in the USA and Thatcher in the UK. These policies reflected the 
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ascendancy of the Neo-Classical school of economic thought which has remained the 
economic orthodoxy until the recent financial crisis. This is reflected by the stance of 
International Institutions like the IMF which have made loans and assistance conditional on 
the adoption of free market policies such as privatization and structural adjustments. The 
core belief of the Neo ± Classical school is that the market knows best and that de-
regulating markets is the only way to achieve dynamic sustainable growth. . Left alone 
markets will clear, but if interfered with, this function will be lost.(R.Lipsey, 1989,page 626)  
The justification for regulation of markets is related to the concept of market failure. 
Ideally the free market will ensure a Pareto efficient allocation of resources. Pareto 
optimality is achieved when it is impossible to make one person better off without at the 
same time making someone else worse off, but this requires that people behave rationally, 
have perfect knowledge of the market and that markets are competitive. In real life these 
conditions do not apply and so there is the prospect of market failure and a potential 
justification for government intervention in order to redress the failure. Some extreme free 
market supporters reject the existence of market failure outright, while others may 
acknowledge market failure, but consider that policies aimed at correcting them will 
inevitably lead to a worse outcome which simply replaces market failure with government 
failure. Economists use various theories and empirical studies to justify their views and many 
are engaged in the commendable search for knowledge. There are however, some who try 
to use theory and research to justify preconceived beliefs reflecting political or social bias.  
Despite the fact that Warren Buffet has apparently complained that he pays less tax 
than his secretary, the rich and wealthy generally favour low marginal income tax rates and 
abolition of inheritance taxes. So as not to appear greedy they try to justify their position by 
claiming that high marginal tax rates on income provide a disincentive to work and effort 
which will have a negative effect on the supply side of the economy. Supply side economists 
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such as Arthur Laffer are more than willing to provide theoretical support for such beliefs 
ZLWKWKHSUHVHQWDWLRQRIVLPSOHWUXLVPVWKURXJKWKH³/DIIHUFXUYH´ 
In the context of financial markets and the derivatives section in particular, it is 
possible to identify the problem of asymmetric information as a major source of market 
failure. There is a relatively large gulf in the knowledge and understanding of these markets 
between the potential regulators and the markets or situations that should be regulated. 
This provides scope for fund managers and derivatives brokers to exploit their information 
advantage in ways which can distort markets and secure advantageous treatment in 
regulatory measures.  They can apply convincing arguments that certain regulations will 
stifle markets and restrict finance and liquidity, but these claims can only be tested if the 
regulations are actually applied. Until then the claims remain theoretical, but regulators 
might be unwilling to take the risk and be blamed for the ensuing crisis.  Policy makers 
generally prefer to err on the side of caution than on the side of boldness.  
Alan Greenspan is a good example of this conservative approach to regulation. While 
Chairman of the Federal Reserve he was widely respected as a cautious and prudent 
practitioner of monetary policy who safeguarded the US economy from inflation while at the 
same time promoting steady growth. Much of this growth and the optimism it generated in 
the economy was the result of growth and diversification in the financial sector and the 
regulatory framework that existed was not appropriate for the plethora of new derivative 
products. In hindsight, Greenspan has been criticized for not predicting the subsequent 
developments in the housing market and the financial markets and for failing to impose 
regulatory safeguards in anticipation of the changing financial market. 
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With respect to policy options we need to be aware of the right of centre/left of 
centre divide which characterizes most European and American politics. As stated above, our 
contention is that political affiliation or loyalty will influence the degree of support for 
regulation and type of regulation advocated. In pursuance of this aim we have selected 
articles appearing in the Wall Street Journal as representative of the right of centre 
viewpoint and articles appearing in the International Herald Tribune (which is also the global 
edition of the New York Times) as representative of the left of centre viewpoint. When the 
expressed views and opinions of our selected populations are evaluated and analysed an 
attempt will be made to assess the extent to which attitudes towards derivative control 
reflect political views. It is possible that the severity and significance of the crisis will 
transcend party political lines, but our hypothesis is that the right of centre views expressed 
in the Wall Street Journal (European edition) will be less in favour of derivative controls than 
the left of centre views expressed in the International Herald Tribune. The reasons for which 
we selected these specific newspapers are more deeply explained partly in the literature 
review and the methodology sections.        
 In attempting to examine and analyze the literature pertaining to the financial crisis 
it is first necessary to identify the groups or populations who are relevant to the debate. 
These include lawmakers, politicians, journalists, bankers, economists, fund managers and 
traders, businesspeople and the general public. Our aim is to consider informed opinions 
and therefore we decided to narrow down the field by considering two populations: 
academics and practitioners. We define academics as those who are associated with an 
institution of higher education and who have commented on the crisis. Practitioners are a 
broader group which includes those who are actively involved in the derivatives markets 
directly as traders or indirectly as fund managers or credit facilitators, together with bankers 
who are involved in various stages of financial trades and finally politicians. The analysis will 
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not include a comparison of the opinions of the two groups as the purpose of this paper is 
to focus on their political bias and not their occupation. 
As far as the time horizon is concerned, due to the enormous database of articles 
regarding the issue of derivatives regulation, and the limited time that we had, we decided 
to focus on the articles that have been published within the last 2 years. A more in depth 
explanation of how the sample for our analysis was drawn will be presented on the 
Methodology chapter. 
For practical purposes we are limited to selecting articles and lectures in English and 
from the English language media and there will therefore be a bias towards American and 
European sources. Many commentators place the USA as the source of the problem and 
therefore it is natural for American viewpoints to be disproportionately represented, 
especially in the ranks of the academics, meaning those who have a primary affiliation to 
American institutions. Interestingly, it is only recently that Europe has increased its share of 
articles in economics journals. According to Ana Rute Cardoso, Paulo Guimaraes and Klaus 
Zimmerman (Trends in Economic Research: An International Perspective) in 1999 North 
American (mainly USA) affiliations accounted for 66% of economic research articles with 
only 24% by Europeans but by 2006 the European share had increased to 40% while the 
American share had declined to 45%.  
This increased representation of European affiliated sources of articles has to some 
extent redressed the balance but, American views are still somewhat over represented in the 
literature regarding the regulation of derivative markets and the causes of the financial 
crisis.  
Now that the aim of this dissertation has been made clear, it would be essential to 
explain how this dissertation is going to unfold. The next section (part II) is a literature 
review. In order to put things into perspective in the literature review this paper will give a 
brief overview of what derivatives are and of the differences between regulated and 
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unregulated derivatives. It will then explain their uses and the problems associated with 
over the counter derivatives and particularly the credit default swaps including their risks 
and benefits.  Additionally, we will explain the differences between central clearing and 
trading on the exchange, which are the two methods of regulation that are examined in this 
paper. The purpose of the above is to enable the better understanding of the topic and of 
course the underlying incentives behind each opinion expressed. In the same chapter, we 
ZLOOSUHVHQWVRPHRIWKHOLWHUDWXUHWKDWKDVDOUHDG\H[DPLQHGQHZVSDSHUV¶SROitical bias, so 
as to show that the selection of the two newspapers has a meaning. We will see what has 
been written regarding political bias and how previous reports and analyses have the same 
results with our analysis. 
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows: Part III will be the Methodology 
chapter and will explain both: a) how we did this analysis and b) the reasons behind our 
decisions. It will include explanations for how the sample was collected with extreme care to 
being random and representative. Moreover, it includes an SPSS statistical analysis which 
will show whether there is a difference in the points of view expressed in the two 
newspapers of different political views, so as to show whether there is a connection 
between political bias and the attitude towards regulating the derivatives market.  
 
Part IV will include an analysis of the statistical results presented in the methodology 
chapter. There, we will try to put flesh on the bones of the numbers generated through the 
statistical analysis by presenting examples from the newspapers articles. Furthermore in this 
chapter an attempt will be made to give an answer to the question of which market is more 
efficient, the regulated or the free market after having examined and collected information 
and opinions from a plethora of articles journals and scholars. Of course the main points will 
be drawn from the articles that were used in our analysis. 
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Finally, the last section Part V will draw a conclusion, which will examine the method 
of regulation that has emerged as the more efficient by our examination. It will sum up the 
findings of the statistical analysis and we will discuss whether the free market or a regulated 
market would be more efficient. 
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II. Literature Review 
 
Derivatives: 
(a) Brief Background 
 $EULHIGHVFULSWLRQRIGHULYDWLYHVLV µ'HULYDWLYHVDUHFRQWUDFWVWKDWWUDQVIHUILQDQFLDO
risk from one investor to another for compensation. For example, a call option gives one 
investor the right to buy an asset from another, in the future, at a pre-DUUDQJHG SULFH¶
(Duffie, 2009). 
 The derivatives contracts come under two groups which are distinguished by the way 
they are traded in the market: 
x Exchange traded derivatives (ETD) are traded on exchanges. An exchange is a 
centralized facility, such as an electronic communications network, for matching the 
bids and offers of many buyers (end-users) and seller (dealer). Primarily futures and 
options are traded in this way. Their trade is relatively transparent.  
x Over-the-Counter (OTC) derivatives are contracts that are privately negotiated 
between two parties: the buyer and the seller. The µEX\HU¶ makes periodic payments 
WR WKH µseller, and in return receives a payoff if an underlying financial instrument 
defaults. Swaps, forward rate agreements and exotic options are mostly traded in 
this way. Their trade is of limited transparency and less frequently cleared. 
 Any derivatives trade, whether ETD or OTC can be cleared through a central 
counterparty, which assumes responsibility for the counterparty performance of both sides 
of a trade. Essentially all derivatives traded on exchanges are centrally cleared. [Although] 
Over-the Counter derivatives are centrally cleared if both parties decide to assign the trade 
to a central counterparty, and if the central counterparty accepts the assignment (Duffie, 
Lee, Lubke, 2010). 
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 One of the main reasons some derivatives are traded over the exchanges while 
others are traded in Over-the-Counter markets is due to the diverse nature of derivatives 
contracts that makes it difficult to match buyers and sellers in an exchange-like trading 
environment with a system of rules.  
 
(b) Unregulated Derivatives: 
 Until the 1980s, the derivative contracts could only be traded in the regulated 
commodities markets. The unregulated OTC derivatives market emerged with the expansion 
RIWKHH[FOXVLRQRI³IRUZDUG´FRQWUDFWVIURPIXWXUHVFRQWUDFWUHJXODWLRQ 
 7KLV XQUHJXODWHG PDUNHW H[SDQGHG LQ WKH ¶V ZLWK WKH &RPPRGLWLHV )XWXUHV
7UDGLQJ &RPPLVVLRQ ³&)7&´ WDNLQJ PRUH RI D laissez faire approach regardless of the 
problems that occurred to some investors like Orange County California (see Timeline 
Table). These unregulated derivatives were given approval in the Commodity Futures 
Modernization Act of 2000 (Hazen, 2009). 
 The OTC derivatives come in many varieties. Every derivatives contract though, can 
be constructed from two simple and fundamental building blocks: forwards and options 
(Culp and Mackay, 1994). They include: Over-the-Counter foreign currency contracts, 
interest rate contracts, equity linked contracts, commodity contracts, credit default swaps 
and other highly complex derivatives. 
 According to the surveys conducted by the Bank of International Settlements (BIS) 
(see Table1) the OTC derivatives market has grown dramatically: 
Total [global] notional amounts outstanding for over-the-counter 
(OTC) derivatives LQFUHDVHG«LQWKHVHFRQGKDOIRIWR$615 
trillion« 
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This is up from more than $15 trillion 20 years ago.  
GLOBAL OTC DERIVATIVES 
MARKET 
Notional  
Amounts  
Outstandin
g 
Gross  
Market  
Value 
% 
        
Foreign Exchange Contracts 
(FOREX) 49,196 2,069 9.6 
        
Interest Rate Contracts 449,793 14,018 65.0 
        
Equity-linked Contracts 6,591 710 3.3 
        
Commodity Contracts 2,944 545 2.5 
        
Credit Default Swaps (CDS) 32,693 1,801 8.3 
        
Others 73,456 2,440 11.3 
        
GRAND TOTAL  614,673 21,583 100 
 
Table 1: Global OTC derivatives market 
Amounts Outstanding, in billions of US dollars 
Source: Bank of International Settlements (BIS), May 2010 
  
 7KH µQRWLRQDO DPRXQW¶ RI D GHULYDWLYHV FRQWUDFW LV WKH PDUNHW YDOXH RI WKH DVVHW
whose risk is transferred by the derivative. 
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 If the global notional amount outstanding for derivatives is approximately $1000 
trillion, then the global OTC derivatives constitute about 61.5% of the total global notional 
amounts of derivatives - both ETD and OTC - outstanding. Stulz (2009) points out that 
³PXFKRI WKHGLIIHUHQFH LQVL]HEHWZHHQWKH2YHU-the-Counter markets and the exchange-
traded markets is accounted for, by the fact that these two types of markets work very 
GLIIHUHQWO\´WKHGLIIHUHQFHLVDOUHDG\H[SODLQHGLQDDERYH 
 
(c) Uses of Derivatives 
 Derivatives are mainly used for hedging, speculation and arbitrage.  
 As Culp & Mackay (1994) state derivatives provide numerous and substantial benefits 
to end-users. Corporations, governmental entities and financial institutions benefit from 
derivatives through lower funding costs and more diversifies funding sources. Derivatives, 
moreover, provide an efficient method for end-users to better hedge and manage their 
exposures to risk from price and interest rate fluctuations. Finally, they provide an effective, 
low-cost means for corporations and institutional investors effectively to manage their 
portfolios of assets and liabilities. 
  In other words, derivatives provide an opportunity for risk-shifting as well as 
LQYHVWPHQW RSSRUWXQLWLHV +D]HQ  $FFRUGLQJ WR -RKQVRQ  ³GHULYDWLYHV KDYH
always been a type of insurance. They differ from the classical model only in that, instead of 
DVVHPEOLQJDµULVNSRRO¶IXQGHGE\DODUJHQXPEHURIDW-risk holders, the risk is passed on to 
people who would not otherwise face iW´ 
 Since derivatives are characterized as a type of insurance it would be beneficial to 
discuss the issue of moral hazard that is always a problem with insurance instruments. Moral 
KD]DUGSHUVHFDQEHGHILQHGDV³WKHULVNWKDWWKHSUHVHQFHRIDFRQWUDFWZLOOKDYHDQHIIHFW
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on the behaviour of one or more parties. In other words, people might act in their best 
interest, without taking into consideration the moral consequences of their actions. For 
instance, when covered against a specific loss, one may increase his risk taking attitude.  
 
(d) Problems associated with OTC derivatives. 
 There are two main problems associated with OTC derivatives and particularly with 
Credit Default Swaps (CDS) which will be explained further in this paper. 
(1) Corruption. Because transactions are negotiated privately, a trade may not be 
conducted at the best price and products can be sold by banks at unfair prices to the 
buyers. Alternatively, there is a possibility of corruption where an employee of a 
financial firm does conduct a transaction at a price to his advantage, in exchange for 
a bribe. 
(2) Counter-party risk. Counterparty risk reflects the potential for the counterparty to fail 
to meet its payment obligation. That is, when either the buyer or the seller becomes 
insolvent the other is left holding a non-performing contract. 
 Because the OTC derivatives market is very big, with (615) trillions of dollars worth 
of positions worldwide, when a company holds large OTC derivatives position, it can 
generate systemic risk 7KDW LV WKHUH FDQ EH D µGRPLQR HIIHFW¶ ZKHUH WKH IDLOXUH RI Rne 
company triggers off the failures of others. A good example to this is Bear Stearns, one of 
the giants of Wall Street investment banking. Bear Stearns was a very large player in the 
OTC market for Credit Default Swaps (CDS) and it was in distress. Its bankruptcy would 
have generated a disruption for all the counterparties, possibly across the entire CDS 
market. The US Federal Reserve Board gave J P Morgan a short-term line of credit ± tens of 
billions of dollars - to assist the purchase of Bear Stearns by J P Morgan in order to avoid 
the collapse of the entire financial system. (Shah, 2008). 
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(e) Credit Default Swaps (CDS ): Risks & Benefits 
 As (Engdahl, 2008) points out, the Credit Default Swap was invented a few years 
ago by a young Cambridge University mathematics graduate, Blythe Masters, hired by J.P. 
Morgan Chase Bank in New York. The then-fresh university graduate convinced her bosses 
at Morgan Chase to develop a revolutionary new risk product, the CDS as it soon became 
known.  
 A Credit Default Swap (CDS) is a type of OTC derivative. In simple terms, it is a 
bilateral contract in which a protection buyer agrees to pay a periodic fee in exchange for a 
payment by the protection seller if a bond or a loan defaults.  
 
CDS Diagram by Scott Pollack 
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,IDILUPGRHVQRWRZQWKHXQGHUO\LQJGHEWWKHQWKH&'6FRQWUDFWLVFDOOHGµQDNHG¶&'6As 
Leonard (2010) puts it:   
µ«ZKDW LI , GRQ
W RZQDQ\*0 JHQHUDO0RWRUV ERQGV EXW , VWLOO EX\ LQVXUDQFH
against the possibility of a GM default? In that case, I would be purchasing what is 
known in the trade as a "naked" credit default swap -- akin, say some detractors, 
to buying fire insurance on a house that you don't even own. I would be making a 
bet, plain and simple, on GM's credit-worthiness. A bet that wouldn't pay off, 
XQOHVVVRPHWKLQJEDGKDSSHQHGWR*0¶ 
 7KHEHQHILWVDVVRFLDWHGZLWK&'6VD\6NHHODQG3DUWQR\LQFOXGHµLQFUHDVHG
opportunities for hedging, increased liquidity, reduced transaction costs, and a deeper and 
potentially more efficient market for trading credit risk. [On the other hand], the risks 
associated with CDS are moral hazard and other incentive problems, limited disclosure, 
SRWHQWLDOV\VWHPLFULVNKLJKWUDQVDFWLRQFRVWVDQGWKHPLVSULFLQJRIFUHGLW¶ 
 Despite experiencing very considerable growth over the last few years, the CDS 
market is relatively small, (accounting for 8.3% of the global OTC market in terms of 
notional amounts (see Table 1). Nevertheless, as Eric Dinallo, the former superintendent of 
the New York State Insurance Department, estimated in a January 2009 interview, as much 
as 80% RIWKH&'6PDUNHWLVWUDGHGE\ILUPVWKDWGRQ¶WRZQWKHXQGHUO\LQJGHEW(Dinallo, 
2009) 
 It is worthwhile noticing that, although it existed since 1990, the CDS market 
increased enormously starting in 2003. According to the ISDA Market Survey 1987-present, 
by the end of 2007, the notional outstanding amount was $62.2 trillion, falling to 
$30.4 WULOOLRQE\WKHHQGRI%XLWHUUHDVRQVRXWDVIROORZVµ,WLVFHUWDLQO\OLNHO\
that notional outstanding stock of derivatives and the trading volumes would fall to a 
quarter or less of their 2007 levels if derivatives could be used only to buy insurance, not to 
SODFHEHWV¶ 
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(f) Derivatives regulations: Brief explanations and differences 
Clearing houses:  
 A clearing house is defined as a financial institution that provides clearing and 
settlement services for financial and commodities derivatives as well as securities 
transactions. In more detail, the role of a clearing house would be to serve as an 
intermediary between 2 clearing participants (ie 2 companies trading with each other). The 
purpose of such an intermediary would be to minimize the risk of either party failing to meet 
its trade settlement obligations. In order for the clearing house to be able to minimise the 
risk of default it must net the offsetting transactions between the parties involved in each 
contract. Thus clearing houses normally require collateral deposits, in other words margin 
payments, examine the creditworthiness of the clearing participants and in some cases even 
offer a guarantee fund that can be used to cover for losses that exceed the collateral 
deposit of a defaulting clearing participant. The following illustration, Chart 1- taken from 
³7KH(FRQRPLVW´DSULO- VKRZVWKH³RUGHU´WKDWZRXOGSUHVHUYHWKURXJKDFHQWUDO
clearing house. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 17 
 
Chart 1 
 
³7KH(FRQRPLVW´$SULO 
 
Standardization / Exchange:  
 Standardization of OTC derivatives trading would imply that contracts would ensure 
their liquidity. Standardizes contracts would demand less flexibility. A futures contract is 
standardizes contract, referring to a specific asset, at a specific price and quantity for a 
given future date. In that way the contract will be feasible to be traded on exchange and 
thus in a way defaulting risk would be minimised. This would imply that such a contract will 
no longer be merely a private agreement between two or more counterparties that does not 
KDYHWRIROORZVSHFLILFVWULFWUXOHVDQGWKHUHIRUHZRXOGQDUURZWKHEDQNV¶EDUJDLQLQJSRZHU
possibly UHGXFLQJ WKHLUSURILWV ,QRWKHUZRUGV LWZRXOG LQDPDQQHU FDQFHO WKH ³RYHU WKH
FRXQWHU´QDWXUHRI27&GHULYatives.  
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Differences: 
 The most important differences between mandatory clearing and mandatory 
exchange trading are put excellently on the article below H[WUDFWHGIURP³7KH(FRQRPLVW´µV
blog on the internet: (http://www.economist.com/blogs/freeexchange/2010/04/derivatives)  
³A clearing requirement is a requirement that all eligible derivatives be cleared on a 
central clearinghouse (also known as a central counterparty, or CCP). A clearinghouse 
provides critical counterparty risk mitigation by mutualizing the losses from a clearing 
member's failure, netting clearing members' trades out every day, and requiring that parties 
post collateral every day. Clearinghouses also centralize trade reporting, and can provide 
any level of post-trade transparency to the OTC derivatives markets that your heart desires 
² same-day trade reporting, including prices, aggregate and counterparty-level position 
data, etc. Virtually all of the harmful opacity and murkiness of the current OTC derivatives 
markets can be ended with just a clearing requirement ² that is, a clearing requirement is a 
prerequisite for getting rid of the harmful opacity in OTC derivatives; an exchange-trading 
requirement is not...´ 
2Q WKH RWKHU KDQG WKH H[FKDQJH WUDGHGGHULYDWLYHV KDYH WKHREOLJDWLRQ WR XVH ³D
particular type of trade execution venuHH[FKDQJHVDOVRNQRZQDVERDUGVRIWUDGH´,ELG. 
None of the other requirements are present. The main difference between exchange traded 
derivatives and clearing houses is the pricing transparency. Clearing houses provide post-
trade transparency, whereas trading through the exchange guarantees pre-trade price 
transparency. As it will be shown later on in the analysis, that is the main reason why Wall 
Street seem to prefer clearing houses to the exchange. They want to be able to charge the 
price they desire, as pre trade price transparency would reduce their profits to an important 
extent as many practitioners have mentioned.  
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Media Bias 
Since my review of the question of regulation of derivatives markets is based on 
randomly selected articles from the ³:DOO 6WUHHW -RXUQDO´ :6- DQG WKH ³International 
Herald Tribune´ IHT), it is necessary to consider the political stance or bias of these 
newspapers. /HW XV DW WKLV SRLQW UHPLQG WKDW ,+7 LV WKH JOREDO HGLWLRQ RI WKH ³1HZ <RUN
7LPHV´ 1<7 DQG WKHUHIRUH ZKDW LV IRXQG LQ WKH OLWHUDWXUH IRU WKH 1<7 VWDQGV IRU WKH
International Herald Tribune as well. I specifically chose these two newspapers because they 
are both regarded as quality press and are acknowledged to be representative of the 
opposing left/right viewpoints in the political spectrum. The former is recognised as a 
FRQVHUYDWLYHRUULJKWZLQJSXEOLFDWLRQDQGWKH ODWWHUD OLEHUDORU µOHIWRIFHQWUH¶publication. 
This categorisation should not be controversial, as it tracks the popular conception of these 
two newspapers. However, for my purposes, it is necessary to have a more objective 
assessment of the actual degree of political bias expressed in their news articles as well as 
their editorials. To this end I have relied on the following publications: A Measure of Media 
Bias, by Tim Groseclose and Jeffrey Milyo, Nov. 2005, the Quarterly Journal of Economics, 
Issue 4. and Media Bias, by Sendhil Mullainathan and Andrei Shleifer, NBER Working Papers 
Series 9295. 
 
,Q ³$ 0HDVXUH RI 0HGLD %LDV´ WKH DXWKRUV XVH PHGLD GDWD WKDW GRHV QRW LQFOXGH
HGLWRULDOVOHWWHUVWRWKHHGLWRURUERRNUHYLHZV7KHPDLQUHDVRQJLYHQLV³WKDWWKHUHLVOLWWOH
controversy over the slant of editorial pages; e.g., few would disagree that Wall Street 
Journal editorials are conservative, while New York Times HGLWRULDOV DUH OLEHUDO´ ,Q RWKHU
words, it is common knowledge that the WSJ tends to be conservative and the NYT tends 
towards the liberal, and this is reflected in the editorials. This bias that the authors identify, 
does not involve false statements or manipulation of facts, but is rather more subtle. It 
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arises from the very facts that are chosen by the editors as important enough to write about 
and be published.  
In order to measure political bias the authors developed an adjusted Americans for 
Democratic Action (ADA) score based on the number of times a media outlet cites certain 
policy groups and think tanks, compared to members of Congress. The higher the ADA 
score, the more liberal the bias of the media or news outlet. 
Surprisingly, the measure of bias used in the study classified the WSJ as more liberal 
than the NYT (85.1 vs 73.7 estimated ADA score). In fact, when restricted to news content 
(i.e. excluding editorials) the WSJ had the highest ADA score overall. This, at the very least, 
shows that there is a striking difference between the news and editorial sections of the WSJ. 
According to the authors, this result is consisteQWZLWKRWKHUVWXGLHV³WKH-RXUQDO¶VQHZVDQG
HGLWRULDOGHSDUWPHQWVDUHDVSROLWLFDOO\SRODULVHGDV1RUWKDQG6RXWK.RUHD´6SHUU\LQ
A Measure of Media Bias). Moreover, the results showed that the vast majority of journalists 
were liberal rather than conservative, though this does not mean that the reporting will be 
slanted in a liberal direction. It is more likely to reflect the views of who provides the pay 
cheque. 
In the second study (Mullainathan & Shleifer) a different approach is taken. Here a 
GLVWLQFWLRQLVPDGHEHWZHHQLGHRORJLFDOELDVWKDWDWWHPSWVWRLQIOXHQFHWKHUHDGHUV¶RSLQLRQ
in a certain direction, and a spin which tries to sensationalise the story. For our purposes 
only the former is relevant. 
Their analysis of ideological or political bias is based on the reporting of a particular 
incident involving a disagreement between two academics that developed into the 
Summers-West saga. The story was initially covered in the liberal press with the Boston 
Globe and the NYT supporting West.  Eventually the right wing press began to investigate 
the issue and gave their support to Summers. In particular the WSJ questioned the validity 
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RI:HVW¶V FODLPV DQG WRJHWKHUZLWK WKH (FRQRPLVW SUHVHQWHG FRXQWHU DUJXPHQWV WR WKRVH
presented in the liberal press. When the story became politicised, through the intervention 
of Jesse Jackson in support of West, the right wing press was drawn into an ideological 
contest. 
Had the dispute remained a simple news item it would have probably not been 
reported at all in the WSJ, but once it became political it attracted their attention. 
Of course, the second study is based on a single case, which though well 
documented does not confirm the general situation of bias. However, it lends support to the 
first study, as it counts as an example of how political bias is generated in the media. 
Together, these two articles indicate that there is substantial political or ideological bias in 
news reporting and that the assumed right ± left classification of the WSJ and NYT is a valid 
one with respect to their editorial viewpoints. Interestingly however, the news media overall 
appears to have a liberal bias which is even shared by the news articles in the otherwise 
conservative WSJ. This is likely to account for the fact that the majority of articles randomly 
selected from the WSJ and the NYT are in favour of financial regulation and stricter control 
of derivatives.  
Finishing this chapter, it would be essential to state how our analysis differs from the 
analyses that have been previously made on the issue of political bias. Our analysis does not 
merely take into consideration the editorials. It takes into consideration articles, and 
interviews and examines what has been included, omitted or not stated and how that can 
affect the way in which the issue of derivatives regulation is treated. For that reason in the 
analysis chapter we have included some parts of the articles or of interviews to prove how 
political bias can be camouflaged inside the articles. 
  
 22 
 
III. Methodology 
As explained in the introduction the main purpose of this dissertation is to examine 
the extent to which political bias affects attitudes towards derivatives regulation. To 
investigate this bias, we looked at two newspapers with different political viewpoints. The 
first newspaper chosen was the International Herald Tribune and the second one was The 
Wall Street Journal (European edition). The first reflects viewpoints of a more left wing 
political bias and the latter represents a more right wing political bias. We decided to select 
two US newspapers addressed to a non US market. In that way, by not selecting a European 
newspaper, for instance Financial Times, we can be more certain that the difference found 
in the papers express political bias and not cultural or any other kind.   For this analysis we 
gathered opinions expressed in the articles as well as in interviews. The reason for which we 
decided to undertake this analysis was to examine which method would be preferred by 
most practitioners, policy makers and politicians, and to examine the political influence that 
individuals may be under when considering the matter of regulating derivatives. 
Furthermore, to a broader extent, this paper and its findings could shed light to the problem 
of newspapers being biased and not objectively informing the people. In a way this paper 
clears out the ideological biases due to which participants may be hiding arguments and 
beliefs in order to favour their agenda.  
At this point it would be essential to explain the data collection process. We used the 
internet sites of the two newspapers and their search engines to generate a plethora of 
DUWLFOHV ,Q WKH VHDUFKHQJLQHZHHQWHUHG WKH WHUPV ³GHULYDWLYHV UHJXODWLRQ´DQGD OLVW RI
articles appeared. However, in order to avoid being biased chronologically we selected the 
articles to be presented based on their relevance to the search keywords. The time horizon 
that we examined were the last 2 years (2010,2011). Both newspapers generated hundreds 
of articles and therefore we decided to examine articles from within the first 100, especially 
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since they were ordered according to relevance. We numbered each article from the first 
100 with a number from 1-100 and then we used a random number generator in the Excel 
((=RANDBETWEEN(1,100))) which produced 50 numbers, ie articles, from each newspaper. The 
articles that matched the numbers generated were then read, analysed and our sample of 
opinions was gathered from them. Therefore the total sample was generated from 100 
articles, 50 from the IHT and 50 from the WSJ. The list of the 100 articles can be found in 
appendix 1. In the IHT articles we found 43 different individuals expressing their opinions, 
and from the WSJ we found 42 different individuals. We followed the aforementioned 
process in order to guarantee randomness in our data collection process. If an individual 
from the sample is in favour of standardisation/exchange ZH SXW D ³\HV´ LQ WKH UHOHYDQW
column. If the individual is against ZHSXWD³QR´,IQRRSLQLRQLVH[SUHVVHGRQRQHRIWKH
two then we left it blank. All individuals have expressed their opinion on clearing houses but 
not all have expressed theirs on exchange/standardisation. 
Table 1. The sample 
Participants WSJ Exchange 
Clearing 
houses 
   Dimon Jamie no no 
Nadal Steve no no 
Barnier Michel 
 
yes 
Cunningham Rory 
 
yes 
Cliffor Smith no no 
Judith Hardt 
 
yes 
Kastner Jason yes yes 
Hill James 
 
no 
Barnum Jeremy 
 
no 
Huntsell Ludger no no 
Cantwell Maria 
 
yes 
Pickel Robert 
 
no 
Mc Greevy Charlie yes no 
Collins Susan 
 
yes 
Lincoln Blanche 
 
yes 
Mahoney James no no 
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Isaac William 
 
no 
Frank Barney 
 
yes 
Coleman William  no no 
Nelson Ben 
 
no 
Backshall Tim no no 
Sokol David 
 
no 
Johanns Mike 
 
no 
Lo Andrew no yes 
Raeburn Richard no no 
Blinder Alan yes yes 
Bair Sheila 
 
no 
Crisson Mark no no 
Kuhn Tom no no 
English Glenn 
 
no 
Cicione Adrea no yes 
Shelk E. John 
 
no 
Williams Mark no no 
Hartzog Jerry 
 
no 
Jeb Hensarling no no 
Summers Lawrence 
 
no 
Kucinich Dennis no no 
Seiberg Jaret 
 
no 
Stabenow Debbie 
 
yes 
Altucher James 
 
no 
Brown Scott 
 
yes 
Giancarlo no no 
   Participants IHT 
  
   Osborne George yes yes 
Barnier Michel yes yes 
Greithner Timmothy yes yes 
Kristof Nicholas 
 
yes 
Morgenson Gretchen 
 
no 
Cocchetti Stephen yes yes 
Davis Howard yes yes 
Tarullo K. Daniel yes yes 
Gensler Garry yes yes 
Garret Scott  
 
no 
Maloney Carolyn 
 
no 
Giancarlo 
 
no 
Lincoln of Arkansas yes yes 
Engle Robert yes yes 
Mc Carthy Kevin 
 
no 
Lucas Frank 
 
no 
Richardson Matthew yes yes 
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Tumpel- Gugerell 
Gertude 
 
no 
Bachus Spencer 
 
no 
Cantor Eric 
 
no 
Wolin S. Neal 
 
yes 
Greenberger Michael yes yes 
Chilton Bart 
 
yes 
Eraj Shirvani no no 
Piplas Athanasios 
 
no 
Chavez R. Martin no no 
Tooney Pat 
 
no 
Sestak Joe yes yes 
Dahlkemper Kathy yes yes 
Kilroy Jo Mary 
 
yes 
Brenner Menahem yes yes 
Kratovil Frank Jr 
 
yes 
Pirrong Craig yes yes 
Markey Betsy yes yes 
Nye Glenn yes yes 
Schauer Mark 
 
yes 
Titus Dina yes yes 
Kelleher Dennis no yes 
Whalen Cristopher 
 
yes 
Angelides Phil 
 
yes 
Harkin Tom yes 
 Peterson Collin  
 
no 
Royce Ed 
 
no 
Bean Melissa 
 
no 
 
Having collected the sample we had to perform hypothesis testing in order to examine 
the extent to which political views of the newspapers influenced the opinions expressed in 
the articles. The following hypotheses were made: 
1.  
(Ho): WSJ opinions support Standardisation(null) 
(H1 ): WSJ opinions do not support Standardisation(alternative) 
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2.  
(Ho): WSJ opinions support Clearing Houses(null) 
(H1): WSJ opinions do not support Clearing Houses(alternative) 
We have only done this analysis with hypotheses for WSJ and not done the same thing 
IRU,+7IRUWKHIROORZLQJUHDVRQ$VLWZLOOEHPDGHFOHDUODWHURQLQWKHDQDO\VLV3HDUVRQ¶V5
value) there exists negative correlation between the opinions expressed in the two 
newspapers. Thus, when we say that H1 is that WSJ opinions do not support 
standardiazation/exchange, it is the same as saying that IHT opinions do support 
standardization/exchange. Consequently, if we reject the second H0 as well and we accept 
H1, that WSJ opinions do not support clearing houses, it is the same as saying that IHT 
opinions do support clearing houses. This inverse relationship between the opinions in the 
two newspapers will be made further clear by a regression analysis later in this chapter.  
 In order to examine the hypotheses, a Chi-square test is conducted. We had to 
SHUIRUPDFDWHJRULFDOQRQQXPHULFDODQDO\VLVDVWKHRSLQLRQVIHOOLQWRWZRFDWHJRULHV³\HV´
DQG³QR´ And since this is a categorical hypothesis analysis chi-squared was chosen as the 
most suitable method, for examining if bias exists in the sample. The chi-squared test of 
independence of categorical variables is used to answer the question of whether the effects 
of one variable depend on the value of another variable. We specify Į level at 0.05. 
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Hypothesis 1 
Table 1 
 
 
 
Diagram 1 
 
 
Count
3 19 22
16 3 19
19 22 41
IHT
WSJ
Part icipants
Total
NO YES
Standardisation
Total
Participants * Standardisation Crosstabulation
41 47,7% 45 52,3% 86 100,0%Part icipants *Standardisation
N Percent N Percent N Percent
Valid Missing Total
Cases
Case Processing Summary
Participants
WSJIHT
Co
un
t
20
10
0
Standardisation
NO
YES
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The first part of the output simply gives information about the sample size. From table 
1 it can be seen that only 3 opinions extracted from WSJ favored standardization compared 
to 19 from IHT. At the same time, 3 opinions expressed in the IHT were against trading on 
the exchange in contrast to 16 from WSJ. In total, 22 opinions favoured  
standardization/trading on the exchange and 19 were against. 
 
Table 2 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
20,421
b
1 ,000
17,681 1 ,000
22,519 1 ,000
,000 ,000
19,923 1 ,000
41
Pearson
Chi-Square
Continuity
Correction
a
Likelihood Ratio
Fisher's Exact
Test
Linear-by-Linear
Association
N of  Valid Cases
Value df
Asy mp.
Sig.
(2-sided)
Exact
Sig.
(2-sided)
Exact
Sig.
(1-sided)
Chi-Square Tests
Computed only  f or a 2x2 tablea. 
0 cells (,0%) hav e expected count less than 5.  The minimum expected
count is 8,80.
b. 
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Table 3 
 
As it can be seen from table 2, the value of the chi-squared statistic is 20.42. The chi-
squared statistic has 1 degree of freedom (from the df column.) The last column gives the 
two-tailed p value associated with the chi-squared value. In this case, the p value equals 
.000. In table 3, there is an important warning at the bottom of the Chi-Square output. The 
warning tells us that 0% of the cell have expected frequencies less than 5. Thus, none of 
the assumptions of chi-square has been violated and the results may be meaningful. 
Also, p-value (.0000 in this case) is less than the Į value(.05) and therefore we can 
reject H0. Thus, we conclude that opinions expressed in the WSJ do not favor 
standardization/exchange in relation to derivatives regulation. From table 4, we can 
conclude that the strength of association between the two variables ( opinions in 
newspapers and standardization) is valid (p-value=.000) and also that there is a negative 
relation meaning that opinions expressed in the WSJ do not favor standardization. 
$GGLWLRQDOO\WKH3HDUVRQ¶V5YDOXHRI-0.706 shows a negative relation between WSJ 
and IHT opinions. This is extremely important because it shows that by rejecting Ho and 
stating that WSJ opinions are not in favor of regulation, IHT opinions are indeed in favor of 
regulation. 3HDUVRQ¶V SURGXFW PRPHQW FRUUHODWLRQ FRHIILFLHQW VKRZV WKH VWUHQJWK RI OLQHDU
-,706 ,111 -6,221 ,000
c
-,706 ,111 -6,221 ,000
c
41
Pearson's
R
Interv al by  Interv al
Spearman
Correlation
Ordinal by  Ordinal
N of  Valid Cases
Value
Asy mp.
Std.  Errora Approx. Tb
Approx.
Sig.
Symmetric Measures
Not assuming the null hy pothesis.a. 
Using the asymptotic standard error assuming the null hy pothesis.b. 
Based on normal approximation.c. 
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dependence between two variables, in this case opinions in WSJ and opinions in IHT. The 
highly negative -0.706 proves the negative correlation between the opinions expressed in 
the newspapers and that is something that we were expecting. 
 
Table 4 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
-,706 ,111 -6,221 ,000
c
-,706 ,111 -6,221 ,000
c
41
Pearson's
R
Interv al by  Interv al
Spearman
Correlation
Ordinal by  Ordinal
N of  Valid Cases
Value
Asy mp.
Std.  Errora Approx. Tb
Approx.
Sig.
Symmetric Measures
Not assuming the null hy pothesis.a. 
Using the asymptotic standard error assuming the null hy pothesis.b. 
Based on normal approximation.c. 
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Hypothesis 2 
As it can be seen from table 5, 27 from the opinions expressed in IHT were in favor of 
clearing houses, whereas only 13 opinions from the WSJ were in favor. As far as the 
opinions against clearing houses are concerned, we can see that 16 opinions from the IHT 
did not favor clearing houses, when 29 opposed to clearing houses from the WSJ.  
Table 5 
 
 
Diagram 2. 
 
Count
16 27 43
29 13 42
45 40 85
IHT
WSJ
Part icipants
Total
NO YES
Clearing houses
Total
Participants * Clearing houses Crosstabulation
85 98,8% 1 1,2% 86 100,0%
Part icipants
* Clearing
houses
N Percent N Percent N Percent
Valid Missing Total
Cases
Case Processing Summary
Participants
WSJIHT
Co
un
t
30
20
10
Clearing houses
NO
YES
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Table 6 
 
From table 6, it is concluded that the value of the chi-squared statistic is 8.645. The 
chi-squared statistic has 1 degree of freedom (from the df column.) The last column gives 
the two-tailed p value associated with the chi-squared value. In this case, the p-value equals 
.005. In table 6, there is an important warning at the bottom of the Chi-Square output. The 
warning tells us that 0% of the cells have expected frequencies less than 5. Thus, once 
again none of the assumptions of chi-square has been violated and the results may be 
meaningful. 
Additionally, p-value (.005 in this case) is less than the Į value(.05) and we again 
reject H0. So, we conclude that opinions in  WSJ do not favor clearing houses in relation to 
derivatives regulation. From table 7, we can conclude that the strength of association 
between two variables(newspapers writers and clearing houses) is valid(p-value=.003) and 
also that there is a negative relation meaning that WSJ opinions do not favor clearing 
houses. At the same time it showsGXHWRWKH3HDUVRQ5¶VYDOXHRI-.319 that opinions in 
IHT do favor clearing houses showing, taking into consideration the results from the first 
8,645
b
1 ,003
7,414 1 ,006
8,803 1 ,003
,005 ,003
8,543 1 ,003
85
Pearson
Chi-Square
Continuity
Correction
a
Likelihood Ratio
Fisher's Exact
Test
Linear-by-Linear
Association
N of  Valid Cases
Value df
Asy mp.
Sig.
(2-sided)
Exact
Sig.
(2-sided)
Exact
Sig.
(1-sided)
Chi-Square Tests
Computed only  f or a 2x2 tablea. 
0 cells (,0%) hav e expected count less than 5.  The minimum expected
count is 19,76.
b. 
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hypothesis as well relating to standardization/exchange, that there is a clear relation 
between political bias and attitude towards derivatives regulation. 
 
Table 7 
 
 From the analysis so far it is evident that as expected, Wall Street Journal which is a 
newspaper of a more right wing perspective does not favour any kind of regulation, in 
contrast to the International Herald Tribune opinions from which favour both clearing 
houses and trading through the exchange. However, as will be discussed later, the preferred 
method are the clearing houses. Since our data is categorical and non-numerical it would be 
GLIILFXOWWRH[SUHVVWKHVDPSOH¶VSUHIHUHQFHLQRQHRIWKHWZRPHWKRGV0HUHO\WKHIDFWWKDW
more opinions are in favour of clearing houses does not suffice.  
 In order to further assure the findings from the above chi-squared test we will also 
perform a regression analysis that is expected and should show an inverse relation between 
WKH RSLQLRQV H[SUHVVHG LQ HDFK QHZVSDSHU 7KLV ZLOO YHULI\ WKH 3HDUVRQ¶V U YDOXH VWDWHG
above and also the fact that indeed political bias does affect attitude towards regulating 
derivatives. 
-,319 ,103 -3,066 ,003
c
-,319 ,103 -3,066 ,003
c
85
Pearson's
R
Interv al by  Interv al
Spearman
Correlation
Ordinal by  Ordinal
N of  Valid Cases
Value
Asy mp.
Std.  Errora Approx. Tb
Approx.
Sig.
Symmetric Measures
Not assuming the null hy pothesis.a. 
Using the asymptotic standard error assuming the null hy pothesis.b. 
Based on normal approximation.c. 
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Regression Analysis 
We conducted 2 regression analyses. The first one with variable X: Participants¶
opinions ± and variable Y: Clearing Houses and the second one with variable X: Participants¶
opinions ± and variable Y: Standardization/Exchange. 
1st Regression Results 
Table 8 and 9 indicate an R-square of 0.102 and a p-value 0.003, meaning that 
SDUWLFLSDQWV¶YLHZVLQUHODWLRQWRGHULYDWLYHVUHJXODWLRQWKURXJKFOHDULQJKRXVHVFDQEHXVHG
as an explanatory variable. Since it can be used as an explanatory variable we should 
examine what the outcome is. From correlation table 12 it is indicated that participants 
whose opinions were extracted from WSJ most possibly would not support clearing houses 
while those from IHT would do. 
        
 Table 8 
 
Table 9
 
.319a .102 .091 .4787
Model
1
R R Square
Adjusted
R Square
Std.  Error
of  the
Estimate
Model Summary
Predictors:  (Constant), Participantsa. 
2.154 1 2.154 9.397 .003a
19.023 83 .229
21.176 84
Regression
Residual
Total
Model
1
Sum of
Squares df
Mean
Square F Sig.
ANOVAb
Predictors: (Constant),  Participantsa. 
Dependent Variable: Clearing housesb. 
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2nd Regression Results 
Tables 10 and 11 indicate an R-square of 0.498 and a p-value 0.000, meaning that 
participants¶YLHZVLQUHODWLRQWRGHULYDWLYHVUHJXODWLRQWKURXJKVWDQGDUGL]DWLRQWKLVWLPHFDQ
be used as an explanatory variable. At the same time correlation table 12 shows that as 
expected, opinions expressed in WSJ would most likely not support standardization while 
opinions from IHT would. The results of the regression analyses verify the findings of the 
chi-VTXDUHGDQDO\VLVDQGWKH3HDUVRQ¶VUYDOXHZKLFKLQGLFDWHGDQLQYHUVHUHODWLRQVKLSGXHWR
political bias.  
Table 10  
 
Table 11 
 
 
 
 
.706a .498 .485 .3622
Model
1
R R Square
Adjusted
R Square
Std.  Error
of  the
Estimate
Model Summary
Predictors:  (Constant), Participantsa. 
5.078 1 5.078 38.700 .000a
5.117 39 .131
10.195 40
Regression
Residual
Total
Model
1
Sum of
Squares df
Mean
Square F Sig.
ANOVAb
Predictors: (Constant),  Participantsa. 
Dependent Variable: Standardisat ionb. 
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Table 12  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1.000 -.319** .803**
-.319** 1.000 -.706**
.803** -.706** 1.000
. .003 .000
.003 . .000
.000 .000 .
85 85 40
85 86 41
40 41 41
Clearing houses
Part icipants
Standardisation
Clearing houses
Part icipants
Standardisation
Clearing houses
Part icipants
Standardisation
Pearson
Correlation
Sig.
(2-tailed)
N
Clearing
houses Part icipants Standardisation
Correlations
Correlation is signif icant at the 0.01 lev el (2-tailed).**. 
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IV.Analysis: 
 In this section we will try to put flesh on the bones of the numbers that the statistics 
provided. We will take some quotes from some of the most significant parts of the articles 
used to show how their political bias affects their attitude towards derivatives control. In 
that way, we can help both the government and the lawmakers to realise how many of such 
comments should be considered with suspicion as to how biased they are and what 
purposes they serve.  
 The debate for derivatives regulation has started mainly after the 2007 crisis. Since 
then a variety of measures have been suggested to deal with the problems, with some even 
asking for the banning of OTC derivatives. Five years later clearing houses seem to be the 
bet that regulatory bodies and the governments are considering to take. Therefore since our 
analysis has a time horizon of two years (2009-2011) it is understandable that most opinions 
expressed will be focused on clearing houses.  
 As can be seen from the statistical analysis, the political bias does indeed affect 
attitude towards derivatives regulation. Individuals who expressed their opinions in the more 
leftist newspaper International Herald Tribune were massively in favour of some form of 
regulation and especially clearing houses. Suffice to say that from the 43 individuals 
examined 27 were in favour of clearing houses and 16 against. From the 27 in favour 19 
would agree to derivatives being traded on the exchange (standardisation of derivatives) to 
ensure some form of regulation and transparency in case clearing houses were not 
supported by the government and the regulatory bodies. However as it will be shown later it 
is made clear that clearing houses are their prime choice. On the other hand, from the 16 
who were against clearing houses only 3 made a comment about trading on the exchange 
and of course they were against it. The reason for this is that clearing houses have been 
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discussed much more heavily as a potential solution, as a much more radical one, and 
therefore it was the main topic of discussion relative to derivatives regulation.  
 As far as the Wall Street Journal is concerned, as already stated is a newspaper of a 
more right wing approach. Thus, as expected, individuals whose opinions were expressed in 
its articles and comments were largely against regulation. Of course they all mentioned that 
they wanted greater transparency but that was merely for not being criticized for not 
wanting anything to change. Greater transparency can be achieved both by central clearing 
and even by standardisation but merely 13 individuals were in favour of these measures 
from a total of 42. $W WKLV SRLQW OHW¶V GR D FRPSDUDWLYH VLPSOH DQDO\VLV WR H[DPLQH ZKDW
percentage of those who agreed and those who did not agree with derivative regulation 
belonged to each newspaper. In total, 62 opinions were expressed in favour of regulation, 
40 favouring clearing houses and 22 favouring standardization. This shows a clear 
preference to central clearing. From the 62 in favour, 46 were expressed in the International 
Herald Tribune and only 16 were expressed in Wall Street Journal. This means that 74.1% 
of the pro regulation opinions were found in the International Herald Tribune leaving only 
26.9% to be found in Wall Street Journal as is indicated in pie chart1. 
Pie Chart1 
 
IHT 
74% 
WSJ 
26% 
In favor of regulation 
 39 
 
  Adversely, as far as opinions against regulation are concerned, they totalled to 64. 
From these, 45 were against central clearing and only 19 against exchange traded 
derivatives. From the 64 opinions against, 45 were expressed in the Wall Street Journal and 
19 in the International Herald Tribune. In other words, 70.3% of the opinions against the 
regulation of derivatives were extracted from Wall Street Journal and only 29,7% were 
found in the International Herald Tribune as shown in pie chart 2. 
Pie chart 2 
 
  Finally, as far as IHT is concerned, the total opinions examined were 65. From those, 
71% of the opinions were favourable towards regulation of derivatives, which in numbers is 
46, and 29% were against, ie 19 and it can be seen in pie chart 3. With regards to Wall 
Street Journal, total opinions examined were 61. From these, 45 or else 74% were against 
any type of regulation and only 16, ie 26%, were in favour as shown in pie chart 4. 
 
 
 
IHT 
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Pie chart 3 
 
Pie chart 4 
 
 
 Those who favoured these measures in the Wall Street Journal did not forget to 
mention that they only favoured them under certain circumstances and after some 
adjustments had been made. One suggestion put forward was that a provision could be 
made for non-financial firms such as airlines, energy producers and industrial firms who 
reportedly use derivatives to hedge, to be exempted from derivatives regulation. The reason 
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Wall Street Journal 
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of course is that the purpose that such firms use derivatives is purely to cut costs and purely 
hedge against risks associated with sharp changes in oil prices, exchange rates etc.. 
Nevertheless, as 'DOWRQQRWHV³The commission, however, rejects a total exemption 
for non-financial firms. "In particular, [a total exemption] carries the potential for (a) 
regulatory arbitrage for financial firms to shift their trades through the non-financial sector 
and (b) the possible creation and growth of systematically relevant volumes of positions in 
[non-financial firms] that should be of interest to regulators" (Dalton 2011). Also Leonard 
 FRPPHQWV ³$WWHPSWLQJ WR GLVWLQJXLVK LQZULWWHQ ODZ EHWZHHQ what is acceptable 
hedge- legitimate risk management- and what is out of bounds speculation, would be a 
challenge for any regulator´ (Leonard 2010). Surprisingly, Robert Pickel who is chief 
executive officer of the Internation Swaps and derivatives Association, New York, has 
DFWXDOO\ IRXQG D SRVLWLYH FRQWULEXWLRQ RI VSHFXODWRUV ³+DYLQJ SHRSOH ZKR DUH LQ WKH
speculation adds liquidity and depth to the market so that anybody who is a pure hedger, 
can tap that market and know they have a deep liquid market tR WXUQ WR´ (Felix Salmon, 
³VKRXOGZHEHZRUULHGDERXWstock market illiquidity?, 18/10/2011).   
 Another suggestion is that the problem does not lay with hedging itself, but with 
³QDNHG´KHGJLQJLn simple ZRUGVKHGJLQJDJDLQVWDSRVLWLRQWKDW\RXGRQ¶WKave. Instead, 
some pro regulation participants in the sample have suggested the banning of naked 
hedging, however David Havens, managing director of Hexagon Securities has a different 
RSLQLRQ³ZKDWZH UHDOO\QHHG WRKDYH LVQRWDEDQRQQDNHGKHGJLQJEXW a mechanism- 
clearing house or an exchange- where market participants are forced to pony up collateral 
VR WKDW \RX KDYH D PDUNHW WKDW GRHVQ¶W VSLQ RXW RI FRQWURO´ 7R VXP XS ZLWK ³QDNHG´
hedging it would be helpful to quote the words of George Soros which seem prophetical for 
WKH FDVHRI*UHHFHDQG WKH ³DWWDFN´ WKDW LW DOOHJHGO\ZLWQHVVHGE\ VSHFXODWRUV ³:KDWZH
must take away from this is that CDS are toxic instruments whose use ought to be strictly 
regulated. Only those who own the underlying asset or bond ought to be allowed to buy 
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them´ (George Soros, 2009). +H WKHQJRHVRQE\GLVFXVVLQJ ³0DQ\DUJXHQRZ WKDW&'6
RXJKWWREHWUDGHGRQUHJXODWHGH[FKDQJHV,EHOLHYHWKDWWKH\DUHµWR[LF¶DQGVKRXOGRQO\EH
allowed to be used by those who own bonds, not by others who want to speculate against 
FRXQWULHVRUFRPSDQLHV´ (ibid). Finally, the answer to the financial institutions who wish to 
create this loophole with the exemption of non-financial companies comes from 
Representative Barney Frank (D., Mass.), chairman of the House Financial Services 
Committee who said: "I'm worried about the financial institutions taking the end users in 
effect as hostages to get out from unGHUVRPHRI WKHVHUHTXLUHPHQWV´'DPLDQ3DOHWWD³
Late change sparks outcry over Finance- 2YHUKDXO%LOO´:DOO6WUHHW-RXUQDO 
 Let us at this point examine some additional issues raised by those against and in 
favour of regulation. Of course stating the source from which these have been extracted 
shows what has been proved statistically above, but is essential as it will show not merely 
numerically the positions that the two newspapers take, but also how the political bias is 
shown via their writings. Jamie Dimon, J.P. Chase CEO in his interview on the 5th of April 
2011 which was SULQWHG ZLWK WKH WLWOH ³-DPLH 'LPRQ 6D\V UHJXODWLRQV ZLOO VWLIOH HFRQRPLF
JURZWK´ LQ WKH :DOO 6WUHHW -RXUQDO PHQWLRQV ³UHJXODWLRQ IRU RYHU WKH FRXQWHU GHULYDWLYHV
FRXOGSURYHWRRH[SHQVLYHDQGGULYHVZDSEXVLQHVVRYHUVHDV´+HWKHQDGGHG³0RYLQJ27&
derLYDWLYHV RQWR FHQWUDO FOHDULQJ KRXVHV ZRXOGQ¶W HOLPLQDWH ULVN ZLWK GHULYDWLYHV ,W ZRXOG
MXVWFRQFHQWUDWHLW´ (ibid). Indeed this is a point that demands extreme care and attention. 
The problem in the 2007 crises was not merely the use of derivatives, but the sudden and 
abrupt decrease in the value of the underlying assets, ie house prices. Therefore, even if the 
derivatives were centrally cleared, it is highly unlikely that it would have averted house price 
decline. However, we are not in a position to know hypothetically how a central clearing part 
could react to such an event in the future. Since we are discussing the issue of unforeseen 
³SKHQRPHQD´DQGEODFNVZDQVOHWXVGLVFXVVDQRWKHUJUHDWLVVXHZKLFKKDVEHHQWKHFHQWUH
of attention for many articles in the two newspapers. Systemic risk. 
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 Systemic risk can be defined as the kind of risk that cannot be diversified and is 
inherent to the entire market, or an entire market segment. Systemic risk became mostly 
apparent with the current financial crisis to the extent that many economists pronounced 
the crisis both inexplicable and unforeseen (Stout, 2009). It raised two important issues. 
The one issue is whether market forces will ensure an efficient level of systemic risk if they 
are left to their own devices and the other is if regulated systemic risk is needed, what form 
should it take? In the current crisis, systemic risk has manifested itself in the moral hazard 
HQFRXUDJHG E\ ³WRR ELJ WR IDLO´ JXDUDQWHHV )RU WKDW UHDVRQ PDQ\ LQGLYLGXDOV DJDLQVW
regulating derivatives have repeatedly raised concerns over the fact that a central clearing 
KRXVHFRXOGHQGXSEHFRPLQJ³WRRELJWRIDLO´WKXVPDNLQJQRGLIIHUHQFHAn article for the 
Wall Street Journal back in 2009 includes Rene M.Stultz opinion expressed in his 2009 
paper: ³LI FRXQWHUSDUWLHV FDQ IDLO VR FDQ FOHDULQJKRXVHV$QG LI D FOHDULQJKRXVH FOHDUVD
significant amount of OTC derivatives trades, then its failure could have a much more 
dramatic impact on the financial system than the failure of a derivatives dealer. From this it 
IROORZV WKDW FOHDULQJKRXVHVPXVWEHSURSHUO\FDSLWDOLVHG´ (Stultz 2009). The International 
Herald Tribune discusses a paper by the IMF in its article of 5th April 2011 by Stephen J. 
Lubben titled ³7KHSUREOHPVZLWKGHULYDWLYHV FOHDULQJ´DQG FRPPHQWV ³7KHSDSHUDUJXHV
that the focus in Dodd Frank Act on central clearing of derivatives is not the best solution 
and that central clearing parties are apt to becomH ³WRRELJ WR IDLO´+RZHYHU WKHDUWLFOH
goes on to criticize the aforementioned paper and shed light to the points that it omits to 
take into consideration. To be more precise it is stated: ³But what I want to focus on here is 
the way in which the I.M.F.¶VQHZSDSHUHVVHQWLDOO\ LJQRUHVWKHFRVWVRIFORVH-out netting, 
which, if you talk to some in the derivatives industry, is something to be protected with the 
same vigour as apple pie, mom and Old Glory.´LELG 
³In particular, the article in question worries that the move to central clearing would reduce 
WKHDELOLW\RIELJILQDQFLDOLQVWLWXWLRQVWR³QHW´WKHLUJURVVH[SRVXUHWRDJLYHQFRXQWHUSDUW\
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This is pretty typical among banking types, where netting is seen as a universal good. The 
costs of netting are rarely discussed.´(ibid) 
  In addition to the above, Stultz has stated to the House Committee on Financial 
6HUYLFHV WKDW³DV ORQJDV WKHFOHDULQJKRXVH LVZHOOFDSLWDOLVHGDQGPDQDJHV LWV ULVNVZHOO
there is no material counterparty risk with clearing houses. Only this way the systemic risk 
FDQ EH VLJQLILFDQWO\ UHGXFHG´ ³6tultz to the House Committee on Financial Sercvices, 
2009´. However this was not mentioned in the Wall Street Journal article mentioned above 
WKDWLQFOXGHGKLVRSLQLRQWKDWFOHDULQJKRXVHVFRXOG³EHFRPHWRRELJWRIDLO´.  
 Furthermore, as far as the IHT is concerned there are direct comments regarding the 
Republican Party and their attempt to misguide derivatives regulation. To be more precise, 
WKH QHZVSDSHU LQ DQ DUWLFOH GDWHG 'HFHPEHU   ³+RZ WR GHUDLO ILQDQFLDO UHIRUP´
TXRWHV5HSUHVHQWDWLYH6SHQFHU%DFKXVRI$ODEDPDVD\LQJ³WKHUHJXODWRUVDUHWKHUHWRVHUYH
the bDQNV´)XUWKHUPRUHon the same article they FRPPHQWRQ5HXSXEOLFDQ¶V(ULF&DQWRU¶V
VWDWHPHQW WKDW ³$PHULFDQ SHRSOH ZDQW DQG H[SHFW 5HSXEOLFDQV WR FXW RII ILQDQFLQJ IRU
Dodd-)UDQN´DGGLQJWKDW³LWZRXOGEHDMRENLOOHU´7KHFRPPHQWWKHQHZVSDSHUPDGHDV 
WKLVLVH[WUDFWHGIURPDQHGLWRULDOZDV³&RXOGKHEHPRUHZURQJ"$PHULFDQVFRQFHUQLVWKDW
the financial reform is too weak. Not too strong. The Republicans intentions could not be 
FOHDUHU´ )XUWKHUPRUH WKH\ ZHQW RQ WR TXHVWLRQ KRZ GHULYDWLYHV UHJXODWLRQ could end up 
becoming a job killer, and actually made a sarcastic comment saying that it would end up in 
people not being able to afford a loan not to get one. Possibly linking the unregulated OTC 
derivatives market, with the subprime mortgage loan CDSs and the bailout of AIG. 
$GGLWLRQDOO\LQDQRWKHUDUWLFOHGDWHG1RYHPEHU6HZHOO&KDQPHQWLRQV³'RGG)UDQN
financial overhaul signed into law by Obama, with almost no Republican support ± perhaps 
EHFDXVHRILWVFRPSOH[LW\´ 
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Moreover, in another ediWRULDOGDWHG$SULODQGWLWOHG³:DOO6WUHHW&DVLQR´D
sarcastic attack is launched towards Goldman Sachs and its derivative trading business: 
³The Securities and Exchange Commission has accused Goldman of defrauding clients by 
selling them a complex instrument without telling them it was designed so another client 
could bet against it. Testifying before the Senate subcommittee on investigations, Goldman 
executives denied withholding information. They insisted there was nothing wrong with 
selling mortgage-backed products while placing bets against them.  
7KH\FDOOHGLW³ULVNPDQDJHPHQW´0RVWSHRSOHFDOOLWVWDFNLQJWKHGHFN 
We do not know whether Goldman broke the law, but we know this gambling is too 
dangerous. Banks like Goldman turned the financial system into a casino. Like gambling, the 
transactions mostly just shifted money around. Unlike gambling, they packed an enormous 
capacity for economic destruction ² hobbling banks that made bad bets, freezing credit and 
economic activity. Society ² not the bankers ² ERUHWKHFRVW´  The above shows the clear 
position that the leftish newspaper takes towards the large banks. This could be a direct 
result of the political bias of the leftish newspaper. Its criticism for the fact  that large baks 
were too free to act as they pleased is what one would have expected and something that 
verifies the results of our analysis that political bias does affect the attitude towards 
derivatives regulation. 
Furthermore, another article dated April 26 2010 includes yet anoWKHU ³DWWDFN´
towards a Republican member and more precisely Nebraska Senator Ben Nelson. In that 
article Ben Nelson, David Sokol and Mike Johanns expressed their aversion towards 
derivatives regulation. However, the article went on to comment that all of the 
aforementioned have been accepting funding from Warren Buffet whose firm according to 
the article has $63 Billion derivatives portfolio according to Barclay Capital. The article 
actually states that Senator Nelson has received approximately $75,550 but he does not 
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admit to it and did not wish to comment. As a last example we will use one where a 
Democrat is against regulation and is quoted, so as to get her response in the next 
paragraph. The article printed on October 3rd DQG WLWOHG³:DOO6WUHHWJRHV WR6HIFRQ ,,RQ
swaps, quotes of a New York Democrat, Representative Carolyne Maloney who not only is 
against fierce regulation but having teamed up with a New Jersey Republican, 
Representative Scott Garrett stated in a room packed with 400 bankers : ³,¶GOLNHYHU\PXFK
to work with you to make sure New York City is the financial capital, not just of New York 
State, but of the world. If you see a regulation that is unfair, let us know and maybe we can 
ZRUN WRJHWKHU´ The response was immediate and came from the mouth of Mr. Giancarlo 
head of Sefcon who stated: ³the Commodity Futures Trading Commission is proposing rules 
that, betray a hidden prejudice toward electronic-RQO\´ WUDGLQJ ³LOO-suited to real market 
FRQGLWLRQV´ The article goes on to close with a statement by mr. Giancarlo regarding the 
rules that Mrs. Malonyey supports: ³7KHUHDUHWKRVHZKRPLJKW OLNHWRUROO WKHPEDFNDQG
put us back in the regulatory environment that led to the crisis three years ago. Only with 
refoUPFDQWKHSXEOLFJHWWKHEHQHILWRIWUDQVSDUHQWRSHQDQGFRPSHWLWLYHPDUNHWV´ 
From the WSJ a very interesting article dated the 20th RI 0D\  ³+RZ WKH
)LQDQFLDO2YHUKDXO9RWHZHQWGRZQ´GHVFULEHVKRZWKHWZRSROLWLFDOSDUWLHVYRWHG'HVSLWH
the fact that 39 of the 41 Republicans voted against it, in the last paragraph the article asks 
how it is possible to blame the Republicans since 2 members of the Democratic Party voted 
against the regulatory measures. The response came from Mr. Reid: "If I were writing the 
VWRU\LWZRXOGEHSUHWW\HDV\WRZULWHDVWRU\WKDWEDVLFDOO\RI'HPRFUDWVYRWHG«DQG
it would be pretty easy to write the story that 39 of the 41 Republicans voted against it. It's 
pretty simple math."(ibid) The above question could be received as an attempt to remove 
the burden from the shoulders of the Republicans and turn the attention to the two 
Democrats who voted against without at the same time mentioning the two Republicans 
who voted in favor of regulation. Not to mention that one of the Democrats who voted 
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against, Senator M. Cantwell, did so because she thought that the new measures were not 
strict enough on derivatives regulation. 
Switching the subject, and in an attempt to show why clearing houses are preferred 
to exchange traded derivatives we will quote some interesting opinions expressed in the two 
newspapers. Joseph Stiglitz, who has served as a Senior Vice President and Chief Economist 
of the World Bank from 1997 to 2000 has been a consistent supporter of regulation and has 
argued in favor of government intervention to correct market failures especially with regard 
WRDV\PPHWULFNQRZOHGJH+HKDVVWDWHG³7he problem with many derivatives was that they 
were so complex that even if all the information about them had been disclosed, most 
market participants would not have been able to assess their real value. Exchange traded 
derivatives would have provided most of the risk managements services needed, but in a 
PRUH WUDQVSDUHQW ZD\ ZLWK PRUH FRPSHWLWLYH SULFLQJ´ (Stiglitz, 2010). Price competition 
however is not desired by the big investment banks. As stated in the literature review, the 
most important difference perhaps form the point of view of Wall Street has to do with the 
fact that exchanges would impose pre-trade price transparency in contrast to clearing 
houses which would impose post-trade transparency to almost all aspects of the deal. This is 
emphasized in an article of International Herald Tribune on the 19th of October 2011, with 
WLWOH³Derivatives¶¶³:DOOVWUHHWKDVVLJQDOHGWKDWLWFDQOHDYHZLWKDFOHDULQJKRXVHDSSURDFK
but it is strongly opposed to exchange trading of derivatives, which would introduce price 
FRPSHWLWLRQ DQG ORZHU WKH SURILWV´ Therefore, since clearing houses are preferred by the 
majority of those who are in favor of regulation, and since the Wall Street has shown that 
they would prefer clearing houses to exchange traded derivatives, we can claim that the 
more suitable solution to be considered would be a central clearing party.  
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V.Conclusion  
 The issues associated with derivatives and their regulation are many and difficult to 
settle. Derivatives regulation is a topic that has been appearing often in the news lately, and 
results in a lot of back and forth between experts. In fact, these issues and difficulties that 
make derivatives so controversial are also what make them a very interesting and important 
topic to study. The main issue is that there is a deep divide between those experts who 
want derivatives to be regulated and those who do not. Of course, there are some who take 
more intermediary positions, i.e who think that there should be some regulation, but that 
the regulation itself should be severely limited. Still, there is a clear divide between those 
who are in favor and those who oppose the regulation of derivatives. The weight of opinion 
seems to support some regulation and very few are prepared to argue in favour of no 
regulation at all. For instance, even Alan Greenspan who has been the greater supporter of 
GHUHJXODWLRQKDVDGPLWWHG³,ZDVZURQJDERXWWKHHFRQRP\,KDYHIRXQGDIODZ,GRQ¶W
kQRZKRZVLJQLILFDQWRSHUPDQHQW LW LV%XW,KDYHEHHQYHU\GLVWUHVVHGE\WKDW IDFW´7KH
traditional right wing free market view is therefore usually expressed a bit more subtly than 
usual in order to accommodate the apparent consensus in support of some degree of 
regulation. The Economist, for example which is a right of centre newspaper and generally 
supports the non-interventionist free market viewpoint, acknowledges the need for 
regulation, but points out that regulating such a complex market as the derivatives market is 
so difficult as to render it ineffective. (Voters versus creditors, Nov. 17th 2011). 
 
 There can be many reasons for why an expert choses a particular side of this debate. 
However, we wanted to test the hypothesis that an important, if not the main reason for 
why an expert chose a particular side, was his/her political affiliation. This hypothesis should 
not, in itself, be controversial. Political affiliation and economic policy often go hand in hand. 
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In general, advocating for regulation is usually associated with the left and advocating free 
market policies is usually associated with the right.  
  
This classification is especially clear in the United States. The political spectrum there 
ranges from the Democrats (and possibly some environmentalists) on the left to the 
Libertarians on the far right. The Democrats are generally in favor of market regulation, for 
economic as well as social reasons. They advocate redistribution of wealth in the form of 
progressive taxes, state-run healthcare etc. They do not believe that the market will 
distribute wealth fairly, if left entirely on its own. On the other hand, the Republicans are 
less in favor of regulation, again for both social and economic reasons. They believe that it 
is not fair to redistribute wealth, while they also believe that the market will distribute 
wealth appropriately when left to its own devices. Still, they do believe in some regulation. 
They do think that there are some aspects of living in a society that need centralized 
regulation, for example the building of roads, schools etc. Those who do not believe in any 
regulation are the libertarians on the far right. They think that any intervention on the 
workings of the market is unjustified and will ultimately lead to problems. In addition, they 
believe that governments that regulate the economy or the social sphere is usually infringing 
on itVFLWL]HQV¶ULJKWVThis paper finds it difficult to still believe, especially after the analysis 
and the opinions expressed in the articles examined, that the free market is the solution to 
the problems that the financial world is facing. 
  
In Europe, the situation is less clear cut. This is because there are many more 
political parties that span a greater part of the political spectrum. For example, there are 
many parties that are much more left-wing than the Democrats. Also, various political 
parties differ in many dimensions. In other words, the political, economic and social divisions 
in opinion do not always line up, in the way they do in the US. We should mention here that 
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this is especially true of continental Europe, whereas the UK is somewhere in between 
continental Europe and the US. For this reason, in this dissertation we sampled the opinions 
of those writing in US newspapers. However, one of the two newspapers (the IHT) is aimed 
at an international audience. The idea here was that the general framework would be the 
one present in the US, yet it would not be taken for granted, but justified in each 
article/editorial.  
  
Our hypothesis was consistent with the general trend that we mentioned in the 
previous paragraphs. That is, we expected the experts on the left to be more in favor of 
derivatives regulation and those on the right to be against derivatives regulation. To this 
end, we randomly selected a set of articles from two different newspapers (one from the 
right and one from the left) and classLILHG WKH DXWKRUV¶ SRVLWLRQV LQ WHUPV RI SROLWLFDO
affiliation and stance towards regulation of derivatives. As expected, there was a clear 
correlation between leftist orientation and favoring regulation on the one hand, while those 
on the right favored less regulation. A popular argument presented by the right wing lobby 
is that regulation, although necessary, is nevertheless not very effective because the 
markets are always one step ahead and are able to find loopholes to get around the 
regulations. For this reason they support only the most basic of regulations that can be 
enforced, but will have limited effects on the markets. 
  
One worry that someone could have is that the bias in question was not a political 
one, but one centered in the media. We investigated this possibility by consulting two 
journals that have examined the question of media bias in some dtail and have developed 
methods of measuring media bias. Both of these journals confirmed the existence of media 
bias especially with respect to the newspapers that I had selected for the literary review, 
namely the WSJ and the IHT. Interestingly these surveys of media bias found a general left 
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of centre bias conforming to the liberal view as expressed in the political context of the USA. 
The news content of virtually all media was biased towards the left of centre liberal view, 
including the WSJ. The editorial content however, was recognized to be the definitive test 
for the political viewpoint expressed.  
  
However, there were some additional issues that emerged from this study, which are 
quite subtle, but also quite interesting. One was that the obvious political left of centre bias 
among Washington journalists, does not necessarily translate to a news article bias (Media 
Bias page 1225) in fact it appears that journalists tend to fit the expected tone of their 
newspaper rather than try to execute a political agenda. Another is that the USA media 
provides the whole spectrum of views so that the discerning citizen can usually find both 
sides of an argument relating to political issues. The implication is that political bias in the 
media is transparent and identifiable and therefore does not unduly influence people in any 
undesirable way.  
 
It is beyond the scope of this paper to examine every aspect of political and media 
bias and to analyse its significance for overall policy issues. The aim here is simply to include 
it as a potentially important parameter in the evaluation of attitudes to financial market 
regulation. These attitudes will collectively influence policy makers and are at the same time 
influenced by policy makers and it is therefore important to be able to identify the objectivity 
of the attitudes. Hopefully this paper will identify some of the important issues relating to 
the question of regulating financial markets, and in particular the potentially toxic derivatives 
market. Many opinions have been recorded and general comparisons have been made, but 
it remains to be seen whether there is the will or the know how to effectively control these 
markets. There seems to be little doubt or disagreement that greater transparency is 
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needed in order to overcome the potential market failure arising from asymmetric 
information. It is however very difficult to legislate or enforce transparency.   
 
Hopefully, this paper will play its role in shedding light on the debate whether 
derivatives regulation is influenced by political bias. This debate, and thus this paper, is of 
great interest to lawmakers and the public. Lawmakers need to take into extreme 
consideration the reason for which each highly respected individual is in favor or against 
regulation. They should be in a position to block out opinions that serve political agendas 
and focus on solutions that come from individuals whose purpose is to ameliorate the 
financial world and how it operates. Additionally, the public should be informed about 
political bias in the opinions expressed, so that each and everyone can be able to filter out 
what opinions he does not consider to be objective. Finally, lawmakers could possibly benefit 
from the fact that through the analysis and examination of the newspaper articles, we have 
come to conclude that clearing houses are the most suitable solution to the derivatives 
regulation problem, and the most acceptable by both parties. Not to mention that the free 
market has failed to prove its supporters right. And that belief is also shared by the ex-
3UHVLGHQW RI WKH 8QLWHG 6WDWHV %LOO &OLQWRQ ZKR LQ DQ LQWHUYLHZ RQ $%&¶V ³7KLV :HHN´
program broadcasted on April 18, 20VWDWHG³,WKLQNWKH\ZHUHZURQJDQG,WKLQN,ZDV
ZURQJWRWDNHWKHLUDGYLFH7KHLUDUJXPHQWZDVWKDWGHULYDWLYHVGLGQ¶WQHHGWRWUDQVSDUHQF\
because they were expensive and sophisticated and only a handful of people will buy them 
DQGWKH\GRQ¶WQHHGDQ\H[WUDSURWHFWLRQ´ ,Q*UHHFHWKHUH LVDVD\LQJ³7KHVWURQJHU WKH
HQHP\ WKH PRUH VLJQLILFDQW WKH YLFWRU\´ DQG WKH DFFHSWDQFH RI GHIHDW RI 3UHVLGHQW %LOO
Clinton and Alan Greenspan, makes the victory of those in favour of regulation significant 
indeed.    
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